Santa Cruz Flotsam
Big Sur Fwd. Rein.
Bixby Bridge OP
01 June 2025
To. TBA Media
Fm. White Lightning Fwd Cmd (-)..
Subj. DPRK Navy--Failed Missile Ship Launch--Command Chronology, After Action Report
Encl. (1) submitted herewith, fwd. unclassified
1. Organizational Data Matrix: DPRK Failed Destroyer Launch (May 27, 2025) Category Entities/Individuals Involved Roles and Responsibilities Actions/Outcomes
a. Political Kim Jong Un Supreme Leader; directly overseeing naval modernization
(1) Attended launch; publicly condemned failure as "criminal act"; ordered detentions and repairs before Workers' Party meeting.
b. Workers’ Party of Korea (Central Committee, Military Commission) (1) Oversight of military and defense industry policy
c. Ri Hyong-son, director of Munitions Industry Department, arrested for accountability; commission initiated investigation.
d. Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) State media; public messaging Reported on incident, arrests, and Kim’s statements; managed narrative.
2. Shipbuilders
a. Chongjin (Hambuk) Shipyard Construction and launch of destroyer
b. Site of incident; lacked experience with large warships; several senior officials arrested (chief engineer, head of construction, admin manager).
c. Chief Engineer, Head of Construction, Admin Manager Technical and managerial oversight of shipbuilding
(1) Detained for negligence and failure in launch execution.
3. Ancillary Organizations
a. Munitions Industry Department (Workers’ Party) Oversight of military-industrial projects
b. Senior official (Ri Hyong-son) arrested for responsibility in failure.
c. Military Scientists & Technicians
(1) Design, engineering, and technical support Blamed by Kim for "unscientific empiricism"; subject to investigation.
d. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, external) External analysis and monitoring Provided satellite imagery and assessment of shipyard capabilities.
PART II. NARRATIVE SUMMARY
1. Aspect Details
Event
a. The launch of North Korea’s newest 5,000-ton Choi Hyun-class frigate at Chongjin shipyard ended in disaster as the vessel capsized and partially sank minutes after entering the water.
b. Date & Location
(1) 27 May 2025 (incident occurred during launch ceremony), Chongjin Shipyard, northeastern North Korea.
c. Attendees
(1) Kim Jong Un (North Korean leader) and senior officials were present at the launch.
d. Intended Purpose
(1) The frigate, equipped with a vertical missile launch system, was intended as a major step in North Korea’s naval modernization, following the recent unveiling of another destroyer in the same class.
e. Launch Method
(1) Sideways launch (side launch), an uncommon and risky technique for North Korean shipyards, was used instead of the traditional stern-first launch.
(2) What Went Wrong - The hull’s weight was not properly distributed, leading to uneven detachment of supports (bogies), causing the vessel to capsize immediately after entering the water.
2. Key Details
Event Summary
a. On May 21, 2025, North Korea attempted to launch a new 5,000-ton Choe Hyon-class destroyer at the Chongjin Shipyard.
b. The launch failed when the stern slipped into the water while the bow remained on the ramp, causing the vessel to capsize and sustain significant hull damage.
c. Kim Jong Un was present and immediately condemned the incident as a "criminal act," blaming negligence and lack of scientific rigor.
(1) He demanded accountability and rapid repairs before a major Workers' Party meeting in June.
d. Four officials were detained: the chief engineer, head of construction, admin manager from the shipyard, and Ri Hyong-son, the director of the Munitions Industry Department and a member of the party’s Military Commission.
3. Political Context
a. The failed launch is a major embarrassment for Kim Jong Un, who has prioritized naval modernization as part of his military strategy.
b. The incident disrupted plans to showcase North Korea’s growing blue-water naval capabilities.
c. The Workers’ Party and its Central Military Commission are directly involved in oversight and investigation, signaling the political sensitivity of the failure.
4. Shipbuilding and Technical Issues
a. Chongjin Shipyard, primarily experienced in building smaller vessels, lacked the expertise for large warship construction and launch, contributing to the failure.
b. The sideways launch method was unconventional for North Korea and likely contributed to the mishap due to inexperience and pressure for rapid results.
5. Ancillary and Oversight Organizations
a. The Munitions Industry Department and military scientists were implicated for their role in the technical and procedural failures.
b. External analysts (e.g., CSIS) have highlighted the shipyard’s inexperience and the broader implications for North Korea’s naval ambitions.
PART III. TECHNICAL ASPECTS
1. Matrix Examination: Sideways Launch Failure of DPRK Destroyer, 21 May 2025 a. Dimension Details Sources Date & Location
(1) May 21, 2025; Chongjin Shipyard (Hambuk Shipyard), northeastern North Korea.
(2) Vessel Details 5,000-ton Choe Hyon-class guided missile destroyer; largest warship built by DPRK.
b. Launch Method
(1) Sideways launch from a slipway using bogies (wheeled units); rare for North Korean warships.
c. Incident Sequence -
(1) Stern bogies slid into water first, bow remained on slipway
(2) Asynchronous movement caused vessel to tilt sharply.
(3) Ship capsized, resting on its side with hull submerged.
(4) Blue tarps used to cover damage.
2. Immediate Causes
a. Operational negligence and lack of experience with sideways launch.
- Possible structural imbalance due to heavy armament.
b. Shipyard lacked expertise with large warships.
- Potential issues with slipway rails and bogie synchronization.
3. Damage Assessment
a. Hull scraped, some seawater entered stern.
b. Earlier reports of hull puncture later retracted.
c. Extensive hull and possible internal equipment damage.
d. Ship remains toppled, not serviceable.
4. Leadership Response
a. Kim Jong Un present; called incident a "criminal act" due to "absolute carelessness, irresponsibility, and unscientific empiricism."
b. Demanded rapid repairs before June Workers' Party meeting.
- Expressed severe embarrassment and anger.
5. Personnel Actions
a. At least four senior officials detained (chief engineer, head of construction, administrative manager, Workers' Party munitions director).
6. Investigation launched; disciplinary measures pending.
a. Technical Context - Chongjin Shipyard primarily builds small vessels, not warships.
b. Sideways launch method rarely used for large warships, requires precise balance.
c. South Korea and advanced shipbuilders avoid this method for modern warships.
7. Strategic Impact
a. Major setback for DPRK’s naval modernization.
b. Delays in planned blue-water navy development.
c. Public embarrassment for regime.
PART IV. CIVIL AFFAIRS
1. Matrix of Responses to DPRK Missile Frigate Launch Failure (21 May 2025) Aspect Domestic Press (KCNA, Rodong Sinmun) International Media (NYT, CSIS, Business Insider, etc.) Social Media & Online Commentary
2. Tone & Framing
a. Framed as a "criminal act" due to "carelessness, irresponsibility, and unscientific empiricism."
b. Emphasized leadership discipline, not technical flaws. Swiftly acknowledged to control narrative.
c. Highlighted embarrassment for Kim Jong Un and the regime.
d. Focused on technical incompetence, lack of shipyard expertise, and rare public admission of failure.
e. Mockery and skepticism. Viral satellite images and memes circulated, amplifying the incident as a symbol of regime overreach and technical backwardness.
2. Details Reported
a. Admitted to launch failure, cited operational errors, and announced detention of responsible officials.
b. Promised rapid repairs before major party meeting.
c. Provided detailed technical analysis: ship capsized due to failed lateral launch, hull damage, and possible structural flaws.
d. Noted Kim's presence and immediate fallout. Focused on visual evidence (satellite images of capsized ship), spread of memes, and commentary on regime’s attempt to hide damage with tarps.
3. Leadership Response
a. Kim Jong Un condemned incident, called for accountability, and ordered punishment for those responsible.
b. Framed as a leadership and discipline issue. Interpreted Kim’s reaction as an effort to deflect blame from systemic issues to individual scapegoats.
c. Noted political motivations for public rebuke.
d. Widely shared clips and commentary on Kim’s visible anger and the regime’s rare public self-criticism.
e. Speculation about internal purges.
4. Technical Analysis
a. Downplayed technical deficiencies, emphasized human error and lack of discipline.
b. Pointed out shipyard’s lack of experience with large warships, flawed launch method (lateral launch), and possible design flaws.
c. Compared with international shipbuilding standards.
d. Commentators highlighted outdated launch techniques and compared with modern practices elsewhere, often with ridicule.
5. Follow-Up Actions
a. Announced detentions and ongoing repairs, promised readiness before party meeting.
b. Fired cruise missiles the next day, possibly to restore image. Noted detentions as scapegoating, questioned feasibility of rapid repairs, and linked missile launches to regime’s need to project strength.
c. Social media speculated on the fate of detained officials and regime’s attempts to distract from failure with new missile launches.
PART V. SUPPORTING NOTES
1. The stern slipped into the water while the bow remained on land, resulting in extensive hull damage and partial submersion.
1. The stern slipped into the water while the bow remained on land, resulting in extensive hull damage and partial submersion.
a. Technical inexperience and lack of infrastructure at the shipyard contributed to the failure.
b. Use of cranes and auxiliary barges before launch suggested a risky and improvised operation. |
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2. Damage | -
a. Ship rolled onto its starboard side, partially submerged, with hull scratches and seawater entering the stern.
b. Satellite images showed the vessel lying on its side, covered with blue tarps, and partially on land.
North Korean media claimed no hull breach, but external analysts doubted the regime’s optimistic repair timeline. |
|
3. Casualties |
a. No confirmed casualties or injuries reported by North Korean state media. |
|
4. Immediate Response | -
a. Recovery efforts began to upright and stabilize the vessel using steel cables and pumps to remove seawater.
b. Three senior officials from the shipyard (chief engineer, head of construction, administrative manager) were detained for their roles in the accident.
c.
Shipyard manager Hong Kil Ho was summoned for questioning.
d. Kim Jong Un condemned the incident as a “criminal act” and called for accountability at a future party plenary meeting. |
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5. Investigation | -
a. The Central Military Commission ordered an investigation to determine the cause and assign responsibility.
b. Kim Jong Un cited “absolute carelessness, irresponsibility, and unscientific empiricism” as causes.
c. Disciplinary measures against responsible officials to be discussed at the upcoming June plenary session. |
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6. Broader Impact | -
a. The incident is a major embarrassment for North Korea’s leadership and its naval modernization push.
b. Public acknowledgment of such accidents is rare in North Korea, indicating the gravity of the failure.
c. External analysts cast doubt on North Korea’s ability to quickly repair the vessel, given the extent of the damage and the regime’s lack of experience with large warships. |
7. Key Narrative Points
a. The 5,000-ton frigate, North Korea’s most advanced, capsized and partially sank during its sideways launch at Chongjin, with Kim Jong Un in attendance.
b.
Technical incompetence, lack of experience with large vessels, and an unproven launch method led to the disaster.
North Korean authorities have detained key shipyard officials and launched a high-profile investigation, with Kim Jong Un publicly denouncing the incident as a “criminal act”.
c. Satellite imagery and external analysis contradict North Korea’s optimistic repair claims, suggesting prolonged recovery and reputational damage for the regime.
8. Key Insights
a. North Korean state media quickly acknowledged the failure but reframed it as a leadership and discipline issue, not a technical one, and detained several officials to demonstrate accountability.
b. International media described the incident as a major embarrassment, focusing on technical incompetence, the failed lateral launch method, and the political implications for Kim Jong Un’s naval ambitions.
c. Social media and online communities amplified the incident with viral satellite images, memes, and critical commentary, highlighting both the technical blunder and the regime’s attempts to control the narrative.
d. This incident underscores the challenges facing North Korea’s naval modernization efforts and the regime’s sensitivity to public failures, both domestically and internationally.
9. Synthetic Intelligence Inquiries. Perplexity AI
10. Image. txu-pclmaps-oclc-22834566_f-9c.jpg (9642×7082)
11. Report prepared by Santa Cruz Flotsam, Bixby Bridge OP/Big Sur (c) 2025.
End of Report
unclassified
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